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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH
THIRTEENTH AND W.ASHINGTON
STREETS CORPORATION, a California
;corporation,
·
Plaintiff aJY~Ad Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7875

CLARENCE C. NESLEN, ELLIOTT vV.
EVANS, H. D. LOWRY, and MARVIN J.
BERTOCH.
Defendan.ts and Resp~o11),de:nts.

BRIEF ON PETITION F·OR REHEARING
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
THIRTEENTH AND WASHINGTON
STREETS CORPORATION, a California
eorpora tion,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 7875

CLARENCE C. NESLEN, ELLIOTT \V.
EV~-\~S, H. D. LOWRY, and MARVIN J.
BERTOCH.
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
COMES NOW, Plaintiff and Appellant Thirteenth
and Washington ;Streets Corporation, a California Corporation, and respectfully petitions this Court for a
rehearing in accordance with Rule 76, Utah R.ules of
Civil Procedure, alleging that this court has erred in
the following respects:
1. The Findings of Fact of the trial court do not
constitute either expressly or by implication ultimate
facts to justify the legal conclusiDn of constructive eviction and this court erred in holding that such a legal
conclusion was here justified.
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2. The trial court did make express findings of
ultimate fact as to heat, light, janitor and elevator
service, which do not meet the standards set by this court
in its opinion in this case to justify its legal conclusion
of constructive eviction and this court erred in so holding.
3. Even if one assumes the absence of an express
finding of ultimate fact by the trial court in this case,
such ultimate fact cannot be presumed when it does not
"necessarily follow," and such ultimate fact does not
necessarily follow in the facts in this case and this
court erred in so holding.
4. The remaining defects other than heat, light,
janitor and elevator service found by the trial court
do not expressly meet the standard of substantial deprivation required by this court in its opinion in this caS'e
and this ultimate fact cannot be presumed and this court
erred in so doing.
5. Barker vs. Utah Oil Refinirng Compawy, 111 Utah
308, 178 Pac. 2d 386 is not authority for the absence of
a volitional element in the definition of constructive
eviction in that the statement therein was mere dicta
unsupported by the very authorities cited in the quotation used, and is against the weight of authority in the
United States.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOFF'AT
& MABEY
PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Respondent
2
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BRIE~,

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEl\lENT OF F'ACTS

This ease involves an action for rent to which Defendants answered with the defense of constructive eviction. Plaintiff appealed fron1 a judgment in favor of Defendants, and this court affirmed the trial court .
. A.ppellant's original brief presents detailed arguInents on numerous questions which it is respectfully
submitted are not discussed by this court in its opinion.
This is especially true with regard to the question of the
necessary volitional element to constitute a constructive
eviction. .£.~ppellant, in its original brief, conceded that
one must be held to intend the natural consequences of
his actions, but argued this was not applicable to this
case. The undisputed fact that the court's quotation in
the Utah Oil Case (Ba.rker v. Utah Oil Refining Comparny,
111 Utah 308, 178 Pac. 2d 386) was mere dicta, constituting a quotation from Black's Law Dictionary which
\vas unsupported by the various authorities therein, was
not discussed.
However, this Petition is not filed to rehash already
argued questions. It is confined to this court's discussion of the lo,ver court's findings of fact. If error exists
here it is, of course, unnecessary to proceed further.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

DO NOT CONSTITUTE, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION, ULTIMATE FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LEGAL
CONCLUSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION.

A.

The Trial Court did make express findings of
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ultimate fact as to heat, light, janitor and ele.vator service which d.o not meet the standard set by this court to
justify its legal conclusion of constructive eviction.
B. Assum.itng the absence of an express finding of
ultimate fact, this cwnnot be presunted when it does not
"necessa.rily follow," and this court erred in so doing.
C. The remaining defects found do not expressly
meet the stan.da.rd of substantial depriva.tion required
by this court, and this ultimate fact cannot be presumed.

D.

Conclusion.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT

DO NOT CONSTITUTE, EITHER EXPRESSLY OR BY IMPLICATION, ULTIMATE FACTS TO JUSTIFY THE LEGAL
CONCLUSION OF CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION.

A. The Trial Court did make express findings of
ultimate fact as to heat, light, ja;nitor atnd elevator service which do not m.eet the standard set by this court to
justify its legal conclusion of constructive eviction.
The essential question in this law suit is whether the
acts of the landlord resulted in that quantum of deprivation of beneficial enjoyment to the tenants so as to lead,
as a legal conclusion, to a finding that they had been constructively evicted.
This court has held that in the light of the specific
lease provisions here (viz., that Plaintiff shall be "sole
judge" of the amount of heat, light, janitor and elevator
service to be furnished) that these defects must be
flagrant and unreasonable in order to find as a conclusion
of law that Defendants were constructively evicted.
Failure of heat, light, janitor and elevator service are
4
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clearly the preponderant objections raised by Defendants.
HFlagrant and unreasonable" defects are thus the
ultimate facts fron1 'vhich the trial court could legally
conclude that Defendants were entitled to relief. We have
now set our standard in this case, which the above-named
defects must meet, for Defendants to prevail. Do they
1neet this1
It is undisputed that the trial court made no such
ultin1ate findings. However, this court felt that the
finding of such ultimate fact would not be necessary
\vhere such ultimate fact "must necessarily follow" from
the probative facts found by the trial court.
Appellants have no quarrel with this rule in the abstract, but they earnestly contend that this court erred
in applying it to this case.
Evidentiary of probative facts and ultimate facts
have been distinguished as follows:
". . . generally speaking, the distinction is
that the findings of evidentiary facts relate to evidence of the existence of some other fact, and
those of ultimate fact to the final resulting effect
reached by logical reasoning from the evidentiary
facts."
64 Corpus Juris, 1276; Trial, Sec. 1154.
It is only necessary, and indeed is preferred, that
the trial court restrict its findings of fact to ultimate
facts.
3 Bancroft's Code Pleading, Practice and
Remedies, 10 Year S.upplement, page
2214.
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It is the exceptional case where a court, in its findings of
fact, adopted as drafted by Defendants, would make express findings as to the probative facts but leave the
highly critical ultimate fact to be presumed from these,
when the correlation between the probative facts and
the ultimate fact of flagrant and unreasonable defect is
the very issue before the court.
Appellant con tends that the trial court did in fact
make findings of ultimate fact in this case. These ultimate facts, however, were not of the quantum of defect
set by this court and urged by Appellant as necessary to
lead to a legal conclusion of constructive eviction; therefore, the trial court erred and should, from these findings
of ultimate fact; have entered judgment for Plaintiff.
A review of the findings as to express defects makes
Appellant's contention clearer.
Finding VII states that heating problems occurred
frequently and during the cold n1onths, resulting in the
"\Vearing of heavy winter overclothing (probative facts).
The finding recites that the heat was thus "inadequate"
(ultimate fact).
F'inding VIII recites that the janitor service of the
premises was "inadequate" (ultimate fact).
F'inding IX recites that restrooms were not clean,
properly ventilated or adequately supplied with soap,
towels or toilet paper (probative facts), and thus were
"inadequate" (ultimate fact).
Finding X recites that janitor service of the hall,
stairways and lobby was "inadequate" (ultimate fact).
Finding XI recites that a barber shop and shoe shine
6
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~tand "~ere

per1nitted to be established (probative facts),
that these were offensive in sight (ultilnate fact), detriInental to Defendants' practice ( ultilnate fact) and disagreeable (ultimate fact).
~.,inding

XII recites that Plaintiff failed to furnish

elevator service after 8:00 P.M. (probative fact), which
greatly inconvenienced Defendants (ultimate fact), and
that their clients were frequently obliged to come to Defendants' offices up unlighted latrine-like stairs (probative fact) to the detriment of Defendants' professional
relationships ( ulti1n·ate fact).
Finding XIII recites that Plaintiff closed the building on Sundays and holidays and after 8 :00 P.M. (probative fact), to the inconvenience of Defendants (ultimate
fact), and to the detriment of their professional relation.
ship (ultimate fact).
Findings as to "inadequacy", "detrimental relationships", and "inconvenience" are only found as a result
of certain more basic probative or evidentiary facts, the
body of which leads to this factual conclusion. Such facts
cannot be probative or evidentiary. They must thus either
be ultimate or, as this court seemed to construe them,
they must be of some intermediate, previously unclassified nature between the two, from which this court held,
one must "necessarily" presume the ultimate fact. of
flagrant and unreasonable defects.
To find probative facts and "intermediate" facts
and legal conclusions, but to omit the one essential factual finding and to leave this to be implied is a most unorthodox approach for any trial court. One· cannot so
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radically interpret a court's findings merely on the basis
of the standard rule that they should interpret inferences
most favorably to R.espondents.
The only natural interpretation of these findings is
that the trial court, and Defendants' counsel, followed
orthodox procedure; that they drafted and found certain
probative or evidentiary facts (a practice oJ'tional with
trial courts) which led the court to their ultimate facts
(viz., inadequacy, detrimental relationships and inconvenience). The sole question then before this court isare these facts a finding of flagrant and unreasonable
deficiency~ This is question of semantics. It is clear
that "inadequacy", "inconvenience" or "detrimental relationships" alone or together cannot equal flagrant unreasonableness.
Appellant does not so argue to escape judgment on a
technicality. It so argues because it believes that this
problem clearly illustrates the trial court's error. Appellant has admitted that this was not the best of office
buildings. Appellant will even admit arguendo the court's
findings that the defects were "inadequate", resulting
in "inconvenience" and "detrimental cliental relationships". But the law says, and this court concurs, that
this is not enough. The trial court erred in holding that
it was.
B. Assuming the absence of an express finding of
ultim.ate fact, this COJYI!not be presumed when it does not
"necessarily follow," and this court erred in so doing.
Even if one assumed that the trial court's findings as
to "inadequacy", etc. were not ultimate facts but of some
8
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inter1nediate nature, the fact then 1nust be faced that
one n1ust, if one ean, presume what the ultimate facts are.
One must here discover a finding of flagrant unreasonableness hy presu1nption.
This court attempts this in several ways which, it is
respectfully urged, are subject to error.
First, this court stated
•'From the fact that the court found the issue
in favor of Defendants and accepted their evidence, it appears that the testimony with respect
to the unsatisfactory restroom facilities, a lack of
enough heat, and the unlighted stairway was such
that the deficiencies in the services involved could
only have been flagrant and unreasonable."
In this way, the findings are allowed to lift themselves
by their own boot straps. The question to be decided is
whether the trial court erred in concluding from its ultirnate fact that constructive eviction resulted. If the
ultimate fact showed flagrant unreasonableness, there
was no error. If it did not, there was error. One cannot,
as this court did, thus say that as the trial court found
that a constructive eviction occurred, that the ultimate
fact must have ;;upported it. This begging the very question in hand. As Bancroft has said,
"Conclusions of law cannot take the place of
ultimate facts."

3 Brancroft Code Pleading, Practice and
Remedies, 10 Year Supplement, page
2214, Sec. 1686.
Secondly, this court relies on the well established
rule that:
9
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"Where findings as to probative facts are
made from which must necessarily follow the existence of a required ultimate fact, the failure to
expressly formulate a finding as to the ultiniate
fact is not prejudicial error."
Yet the very question before us is whether the probative
facts· (and the "intermediate" facts) "must necessarily
follow". In some cases, this is an easy matter. Thus, in
one of the cases cited by this court in support of this
rule (Jessen v. Peterson, Nelson&!; Co., 18 Cal Ap. 345,
123 Pac. 219), it was a mere mathematical calculation
from probative facts. The trial court had found that
Plaintiff had expended One Hundred Twenty-Two and
50/100 Dollars ($122.50) in medical bills. The conclusion
of law gave judgment for One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00). The ultimate fact as to the recovery for personal
injury was determined, although not expressly found, by
sub~racting One Hundred Twenty-Two and 50/100 Dollars ($122.50) from One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) ..
Th.e ultimate fact in this case cannot be found by
subtraction or by any other inference. The record shows
no substantial dispute as to the probative facts. They
probably could have been reached by stipulation. But
the crux of this law suit is the characterization of the
ultimate fact-it is of crucial importance. And there is
clearly nothing w~ich "necessarily" (Fooch v. Bates, 18
Ida. 374, 110 Pac. 265) or "conclusively" (Jessen v. Peterson, et al, supra) makes the ultimate fact of flagrant unreasonableness result from either "intermediate" facts
of "inadequacy", etc. or of probative facts as to shoe
10
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shine stands, elevator service, etc. This is the very question '"'hich determines this law suit.
If it did "necessarily follow" from these various
facts that the ultimate fact would be presumed, then this
court 'vould in effect be stating that in the case of a misplaced shoe shine stand, or faulty elevator service or the
like, that these as a matter of law constitute a constructive eviction. It is felt that this is not what this court
intended-rather than such an inflexible rule, its intention was to leave the determination of such ultimate facts
to the discretion of the trial court which had heard and
\Veighed the evidence at first hand.
When the omitted ultimate fact is equivocal or not
entirely certain from the facts found, the trial court has
a duty to resolve such doubt by a direct finding of the
essential ultimate fact. This court cannot fulfill that
duty for it.
This argument was admirably stated by an Indiana
Court.
'" ... As applied to the instant case, the
rule may be stated to be that if the finding of
fact is of such a character as to involve necessarily
the existence of the essential ultimate fact (not
expressly found), then the failure to find the
omitted ultimate fact may be immaterial. But
when the existence of the omitted ultimate fact
(not found) may reasonably be doubted from the
facts found, or is equivocal and not entirely certain, then the trial court must resolve such doubt
or equivocation or uncertainness by a direct finding of the essential ultimate fact. When this rule
of law is considered with the ru1e that on appeal
all facts not embraced in the special finding. of
11
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facts will be regarded as not true by the party
having the burden of that issue and will be equivalent to finding against the party having such
burden, then it becomes apparent that in the instant case the appellee must fail ... "

Dickason v. Dickason, 18 NE 2d 479 at 483.
As a third approach to the problem this court held
that the cumulative effect of the probative facts would
sustain a presumption of a finding of the necessary ultimate fact although each of the probative facts in itself
might not be enough. Thus, this court said,
"It is true as plaintiff alleges that the trial
court made no specific finding that, in the terms
just discussed, the failures were flagrant, wanton
or wholly unreasonable; the fact remains that he
found they were inadequate, and that, coupled
with the other deficiencies complained of, they
constituted a constructive eviction ... It is not
our problem to evaluate separately the conditions
complained of. It may well be that various of
them taken alone would not be of sufficient importance to create a substantial impairment of
the use and enjoyment of the premises. However,
it is a cun1ulative effect of them ·an which must
be considered in determining the soundness of the
judgment."
This approach, it is submitted, is merely an adjunct
to the "necessarily follow" rule discussed above. It
states that although one such probative fact may not
lead necessarily or even possibly to the required ultimate
fact, several taken together might. With this, Appellant
cannot quarrel; but this does not mean tha.t such cumulative facts must lead to the required ultimate fact.

12
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,\. . hether they do or do not is, again, the very problem
"chich it is up to the trial court to decide.

C. The re1na,in.ing defects found do not expressly
meet the standard of su.bstantial deprivation required
by this cowrt, and thi.s ultin~ate fact carn,not be presumed.
Assuming that the "sole judge" provisions of the
lease only raise the quantum required for the ultimate
·· fact to flagrant unreasonableness in the case of heat,
light, janitor and elevator service, then the other objections are held to an admittedly lower standard. By
this Court's opinion, this standard requires "substantial"
deprivation.
Examining the other objections we see that the court
found that they were "offensive", "detrimental to defendants' practice" and "disagreeable" (Findings XI and
XIII), and not first class (Finding VI). Do these findings by themselves meet the legal quantum necessary~
They must stand alone, because according to Appellant's
contention, the findings as to heat, light, janitor and elevator service do not meet the necessary standard to
justify the court's legal conclusion.
Again, it is clear semantically that "offensive"
"detrimental" and "disagreeable" are not automatically'
equated with substantial deprivation of enjoyment. To
uphold the lower court, this court must once again classify the court's findings as "intermediate" facts and presume the ultimate fact. This approach is only valid if
such ultimate fact would "necessarily" follow. The de. batability of this is clearly shown by the fact that the
court chose to include other facts as to heat, light, jani-
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tor and elevator service to cumulatively buttress its finding; and further, in the case of the locked door, by the
lack of emphasis placed on this by Defendants themselves, the objection being absent from the objections
listed in Defendants' notice of vacating and in their
interrogatory answers. (In any event, this latter objection most likely was 1nerely a question of contractual interpretation.)
D. Conclusion.
Flor the same reasons outlined earlier, it makes no
difference whether all of the court's findings of fact must
meet the higher quantum of deprivation or only "substantial" deprivation. The trial court has not expressly
met either test, and this question being the crucial one
in this case and not necessarily following from the facts
so found, it is subn1itted that this court erred in upholding the trial court's conclusion of law based on such findings of fact.
This is the first time this court has had an opportunity to review the substantive problem of constructive
eviction. It is clear that this doctrine was the result of a
need for a more equitable technique for the adjustment
of landlord and tenant relationships. At this date, our
economic picture is such that it is a lessor's market, and
he has been fairly successful in dictating his terms. New
construction has created more space and the day may
soon be near when it will be the tenant who will have
superior economic bargaining power. This time has al- .
ready arrived in many cities. In any event, Utah landlords and tenants must look to this case alone for guid-
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ance. At this juncture they find that a lease as rigidly
'vorded as one Inight imagine, made and entered into with
tenants "'"ho were trained by their very profession in the
mysteries of the law of contracts, may be broken merely
upon the finding of the trial court that the landlord's
services had been inadequate and resulted in inconvenience and detriment to their business. Sympathy might
dictate such relief in this case, but it will only make
hard la'v which Appellant is confident this court will
have to distinguish upon another turn of the economic
wheel.
Respectfully submitted,

FABIAN, CLENDENIN, MOF'FAT
& MABEY,
PETER W. BILLINGS
ALBERT J. COLTON
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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